To demonstrate well known principles of physiology and pharmacology, most medical schools in the United States today use computer graphics, computerized robots or computer simulations. At a few schools, however, physiology and pharmacology professors still have students vivisect dogs specifically bred and raised for this purpose. In the demonstrations, typically, employees sedate and truss the dogs (usually beagles). A professor cuts open the dogs’ chest and abdominal cavities. Students observe the beating of the dogs’ hearts, the flow of blood, and the effects of different drugs. At the end of the demonstrations, employees kill the dogs and throw them in the trash.

Many people find dog vivisection for demonstration purposes to be morally repugnant and have urged all universities to bring these practices to a halt. To justify their continuation, professors responsible often cite neither scientific necessity nor educational benefit but academic freedom: They claim that, as tenured professors, they are free to teach their courses however they please (and kill as many dogs as they want). When the University of California San Diego still ran dog labs, one professor there went so far as to suggest that, were he not defending academic freedom, he already would have stopped killing dogs for demonstration purposes.

The invocation of academic freedom to justify unnecessary killing and killing unnecessarily to defend academic freedom create a clash between an abstract value— academic freedom— that everyone in academia cherishes and an act— unnecessary killing— that many consider evil. At universities where medical-school professors still use dog vivisection for demonstration purposes, the university communities face the task of resolving the disharmony between unnecessary killing and academic freedom. How can they do so?

To resolve the clash or quiet the dissonance, each university community must answer several questions: Is dog vivisection for demonstration purposes morally repugnant? Does academic freedom protect unnecessary killing? Who decides? And, if universities elect to continue to use dog vivisection for demonstration purposes, how might the professors who run the dog labs make the practice more morally acceptable? We address these questions in turn.

Is dog vivisection for demonstration purposes morally repugnant?
Were there some absolute moral authority, each university simply could pose this question to it. As a society (and as universities), however, we have no generally accepted supreme moral authority. Commentators on the right lament that society has lapsed into a state of moral relativism— a state in which no moral absolutes exist, a state in which all moral values are relative. More keen-eyed observers note that we have become a society in which moral subjectivism prevails. Moral values are not only relative, they are relative within each person’s constellation of subjective values, impressions, and self interests. Each person is his or her own supreme moral authority. A university is (among other things) an aggregation of supreme moral authorities.

What are the rules implicit in a map of your moral landscape?
One way for members of university communities to enter into the discussion of whether killing dogs unnecessarily is morally repugnant is to map their personal moral landscapes, derive the moral rules implicit in the map, and apply those rules to the unnecessary killing of dogs.

A map of one’s moral landscape is a multi-dimensional mosaic of morally laden vignettes. The arrangement of the vignettes does not rely solely upon logic and syllogisms, for in the realm of moral subjectivism, emotional valences of self interest and resonances of subjective impressions often exert more force than does logic. While, among some linkages, logical arguments may prevail, among others, other forms of association dominate. Even so, the arrangement of the mosaic implies rules or criteria of moral repugnance.

Here we suggest some morally laden vignettes that may make it easier for you to tease out the rules or criteria by which you make moral evaluations. Once you have clarified your own set of moral rules, we can discuss where the unnecessary killing of dogs fits within them.

As a starting point, we presume that you, like almost all of us, find some killings morally repugnant. We presume that you find some killings more or less repugnant than others.

Briefly imagine in turn killing or someone else killing individuals of the living organisms named below. Imagine the organisms to be simply at rest, doing humans neither harm nor good. The organisms: a bacterium, an amoeba, an algae, a fungus, a yeast, a virus, a clump of crab grass, a stalk of corn, a 900-year-old Joshua tree, an ant, an oyster, a clam, a centipede, a scorpion, a black-widow spider, a fly, a praying mantis, a lizard, a rattlesnake, a python, a goldfish, a sea bass, a sea turtle, a tortoise, a bullfrog, a robin, a crow, a parrot, a canary, a platypus, a kangaroo, a manatee, an elephant, a rabbit, a squirrel, a rat, a mole, a bat, an otter, a skunk, a walrus, a cat, a bear, a horse, a dog, a pig, a giraffe, a whale, a deer in the wild, a steer, a gorilla, a calf, a chimpanzee, a human being (someone you don’t know).

Does the moral repugnance you feel differ according to the type of organism? If yes, what are the patterns? What are the rules?

Does how close an organism is to you phylogenetically make a difference? Does the jump from single- to multi-cell organisms make a difference? How big a difference does the jump from plants to animals make? Does your moral revulsion increase as you move from insects to vertebrates and from reptiles to birds to mammals? Among the non-human mammals, do you feel the greatest revulsion at killing other primates, i.e., gorillas and chimpanzees? Do you feel the greatest revulsion at killing another human? Do you feel a big jump in revulsion when you jump from other species to your own?

Imagine killing a steer, a wild deer, and a pet rabbit. In your degree of moral revulsion, does whether the organism is wild, domesticated, or a pet make a difference?

Imagine killing an armadillo, a skunk, a seal. How do your reactions differ? Why? Does whether the organism is beautiful, ugly, or ordinary make a difference?

Imagine one person killing a wild buffalo to eat the meat and another killing a wild buffalo to mount his or her head on the wall as a trophy. Does eating what one kills make a difference in the amount of moral repugnance you feel toward the act of killing?

Imagine one person killing a bear that is up a tree, another killing a bear that is charging at him or her, and a third, a camper, killing a bear that has gone into his or her otherwise unoccupied tent. In your moral reactions, does defending one’s life make a difference? Defending one’s property? One’s territory?

Imagine a lion killing a gazelle and eating it. Imagine a human killing a gazelle and eating it. Does whether the killer is human or non-human affect your moral reaction to the killing?

Imagine two spies who have been close working partners for five years. They are on a mission. They have their guns drawn. They encounter a spy from the enemy side. Upon seeing the two, the enemy spy reaches for his gun. One of the two friendlies shoots and kills the enemy spy. What is your moral reaction to the killing?

Imagine the same sequence, except this time, imagine that, at the moment of truth, one of the friendlies shoots and kills the other. What is your moral reaction? Does betrayal affect your moral assessment?

Imagine a substance being applied to a rabbit’s eye. Imagine the substance causing the rabbit pain, the substance eventually blinding the rabbit, and the blinded rabbit being killed. Imagine three explanations for the procedure: The substance had a remote possibility of curing glaucoma. The substance was being tested as a potential ingredient in a new shampoo. A professor was demonstrating to students the effect of the substance on the rabbit’s eye.

What, if any, moral distinctions do you make about the act based on the three explanations? Do potential benefits to human health justify the pain and death of the rabbit? Do potential cosmetic benefits to humans justify the pain and death of the rabbit? Do potential profits for cosmetic companies? Does the demonstration to students? How easy do you find it to differentiate morally among the different justifications?

Imagine a man, after having been convicted of committing a horrible crime, being executed by lethal injection. After his execution, imagine that DNA analysis of previously unavailable bodily substances provides further evidence of his guilt. For contrast, imagine the DNA analysis strongly argues for his innocence. In your reactions, how big a difference does strong evidence of guilt or innocence make?

Assuming that you’re not, imagine that you are a god. Because of their transgressions, you are sorely vexed with your people. You demand a sacrifice. Imagine in turn that your people sacrifice a lamb, a dog, a human virgin (male or female, your choice). Would you find all of these sacrifices equally acceptable? If not, why not? Which sacrifice appeases you the most? The least?

Imagine two male calves born at the same time and on the same farm. One is taken from his mother a few days after birth, chained in a tiny stall, fed a nutrient-deficient liquid diet, and kept in near-total darkness twenty-four hours a day. At the age of sixteen weeks, the calf is slaughtered. His meat (veal) is served in a restaurant. The other calf is allowed to roam with his mother in grassy fields and grow to adulthood. At the age of seven years, the steer is slaughtered. His meat (steak) is served in a restaurant.

Do you find the treatment of one of these animals more or less morally repugnant than that of the other? If so, why?

Imagine two despots. One captures a political enemy, places him or her without a blindfold before a firing squad, and has the firing squad execute the prisoner. The other despot captures a political enemy, has him or her anesthetized, places him or her before a firing squad, and has the firing squad execute the unconscious prisoner.

Do you react the same to both killings? Does anesthetizing the victim change your moral reaction to killing?

If you didn’t have one before, we hope you now have a sense of your moral landscape and of the rules and criteria that shape your moral judgments.

Where does the killing of dogs for demonstration purposes fall within your moral landscape?
If evolutionary closeness to humans is one of the criteria by which you judge the morality of killing, you may want to consider how close dogs are to humans evolutionarily. Dogs and humans are both animals, vertebrates, and mammals. Dogs are canines. Humans are primates.

In addition to focusing on when different organisms branched off the evolutionary tree, evolutionary studies also focus on how different species have evolved since they branched off. For the past 10,000 years, the evolution of dogs has been subject more to human selection than to natural selection. Humans’ selective pressure on the evolution of dogs has produced a species that is loyal, trusting, emotionally responsive, empathetic, and protective. While chimpanzees and gorillas are genetically closer to humans, most people consider dogs to be emotionally closer.

As a god, did you find the sacrifice of a dog to you to be satisfactory? Historically most gods have not. Other gods, perhaps, find dogs too easy to kill or find their behavior during sacrificial rituals too obsequious to be dignified. If academic freedom is your god, is a dog a worthy sacrifice?

In your moral landscape, does betrayal add to the evil of killing? For you, does a human killing a member of a species that ours has bred to be loyal, affectionate, protective and trusting smack of betrayal? Professors who practice dog vivisection for demonstration purposes term this dimension of the moral landscape sentimentalism and admonish us not to be sentimental. When someone says, “We mustn’t be sentimental,” you can be sure he or she is about to be cruel.

If, in your moral landscape, human benefit diminishes the moral repugnance of killing, does killing dogs for demonstration purposes qualify? When medical-school professors use dog vivisection to demonstrate well-known principles of physiology and pharmacology, they are not conducting scientific research. They are not looking for, much less finding, cures for anything. They are not even creating new shampoos.

Is killing a form of speech?
When professors invoke academic freedom to protect their use of dog vivisection for demonstration purposes, what is the source and purview of the doctrine which they invoke? Does it give them the license they claim it does?

Academic freedom is not entirely or perhaps even primarily a legal doctrine. Nonetheless court opinions, law-review articles, and references to court opinions offer perspective on the basis of academic freedom, what it means, and the behaviors it covers.

In every discussion we’ve seen, justices and other authors ground academic freedom in the First Amendment or in the rights that the First Amendment protects. In Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 1952, Justice Douglas wrote:

I cannot for example find in our constitutional scheme the power of a state to place its employees in the category of second-class citizens by denying them freedom of thought and expression. The constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it; and none needs it more than the teacher.

In its interpretative comments to its Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, the American Association of University Professors cites the Supreme Court citing the First Amendment:

[P]articularly relevant is the identification by the Supreme Court of academic freedom as a right protected by the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court said in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."

Scholars too base academic freedom in the First Amendment. In the Yale Law Journal, J. Peter Byrne, a professor of the Georgetown University Law Center, begins his article Academic Freedom with the statement “The First Amendment protects academic freedom.”

If academic freedom is based on the First Amendment, then academic freedom protects the beliefs and behaviors that the First Amendment protects. In its entirety, the First Amendment says:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

The First Amendment protects rights of religion, speech, publishing, assembly, and petitioning. None of these can be construed to include a right to kill. Killing is not speech. If academic freedom is based on the First Amendment and the First Amendment does not include a right to kill, then academic freedom does not include a right to kill.

Professors who claim a constitutional right to kill might fare a little better by citing the Second Amendment. It protects the right to bear arms or, in other words, the right to be prepared to kill. But even it does not grant a right to kill.

One might think that, if the First Amendment protects a professor’s freedom to advocate killing and the Second Amendment protects his or her right to be prepared to kill, then surely the Third Amendment must protect the right to go from advocacy, to being prepared to kill, to killing itself. This extrapolation, however, fails. The Third Amendment veers off into an entirely different direction and only protects professors from having soldiers quartered in their houses without their consent.

Peter Singer, a philosophy professor at Princeton, to use his own words, “advocates active euthanasia for severely disabled newborn infants.” Imagine for a moment that killing severely disabled newborn infants was not illegal. Imagine that instead of merely advocating this practice, Professor Singer and his students engaged in it. If it were legal, could he and his students legitimately claim that academic freedom protected their right to go from advocacy to killing? In Healy v. James, 1972, Justice Powell, in delivering the opinion of the Court, made the answer to this question abundantly clear: “The critical line for First Amendment purposes must be drawn between advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, and action, which is not.”

Who is to decide?
Who can legitimately decide whether physiology and pharmacology professors are to be permitted to engage in dog vivisection for demonstration purposes? Citing academic freedom, the professors themselves claim the right to decide. Departments sometimes step in and decide to decide. Medical schools protect their presumed right to make all decisions regarding their courses. University central administrations have the power to step in and decide.

While they may disagree among themselves about who gets to decide, these parties typically agree that students need have no say in the matter. But is it legitimate to exclude students from this decision-making process?

On the role of students in university decision-making, Justice Douglas, in Healy v. James, had this to say:

Many, inside and out of faculty circles, realize that one of the main problems of faculty members is their own re-education or re-orientation. Some have narrow specialties that are hardly relevant to modern times. History has passed others by, leaving them interesting relics of a bygone day. More often than not they represent those who withered under the pressures of McCarthyism or other forces of conformity and represent but a timid replica of those who once brought distinction to the ideal of academic freedom.

The confrontation between them and the oncoming students has often been upsetting. The problem is not one of choosing sides. Students— who, by reason of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, become eligible to vote when 18 years of age— are adults who are members of the college or university community. Their interests and concerns are often quite different from those of the faculty. They often have values, views, and ideologies that are at war with the ones which the college has traditionally espoused or indoctrinated. When they ask for change, they, the students, speak in the tradition of Jefferson and Madison and the First Amendment.

How many willing executioners?
To decide who can legitimately decide whether physiology and pharmacology professors are to be permitted to vivisect dogs for demonstration purposes, we propose a simple criterion: Who is in danger of being stigmatized personally and professionally by the practice? All white Southerners were stigmatized by the practice of slavery and by the Jim Crow laws. All Germans who were not themselves victims were stigmatized by the practices of the Nazis.

Given the trend in the U.S. of increasing societal concern for animal rights and welfare, at universities where one or two professors are allowed to practice dog vivisection for demonstration purposes, all members of the university community are in danger of being stigmatized by the practice. Only the entire university community can legitimately decide whether or not a few professors are to be allowed to engage in practices that have the potential to stigmatize everyone.

Many members of each university community may not care. To use a popular political figure of speech, they may say to themselves, “I don’t have a dog in that fight.” Others may not see a danger to themselves. Others simply may want to curry favor with powerful professors. Yet many may not want to risk being in a job interview sometime in their lives and having the interviewer say, “I see you were at one of the last of the dog-lab dog-vivisection universities. Were you in the resistance? Or were you a willing executioner?”

Until each university can decide formally if it wants to engage in dog vivisection for demonstration purposes, the responsible course of action is to impose a moratorium on this practice.

If a university elects to continue to vivisect dogs for demonstration purposes, how might professors who run dog labs make the practice more morally acceptable?
If you believe that anesthesia of the victim reduces the moral repugnance of killing, then dog vivisection may not trouble you. The dogs are anesthetized. Most dogs are killed before they regain consciousness. Hence, one can argue that dog vivisection does not entail pain and suffering on the part of the dogs.

Dogs bred for the purpose of vivisection, however, do suffer. The companies that breed them keep them in small cages where they are socially isolated from humans and from other dogs. They are deprived of exercise. They are shipped about the country via commercial transport. In many ways, their plight is similar to that of calves raised for veal.

Some people suggest that, instead of using dogs specially bred for the purpose, professors vivisect dogs from their local animal shelters. Though the numbers have fallen by half in the last thirty years, animal shelters in the United States still euthanize millions of dogs a year.

The suggestion to vivisect dogs from shelters does not provide a moral solution to a moral problem. The purpose or mission of an animal shelter is to shelter animals and find them loving homes. To reduce the population of unwanted animals, shelters spay and neuter animals in their care. As a general practice they kill only animals they cannot place in homes and then only as a last resort. Were shelters to provide dogs for the purpose of vivisection, they would no longer be shelters; they would be death rows. Most likely the shelter would be unable to retain as employees their current staff members who care about dogs.

When we survey our criteria for moral repugnance, we find that dogs are close to us phylogenetically and closer emotionally. Dogs are as our species has bred them to be: loyal, trusting and affectionate. To kill them is the epitome of betrayal.

The dogs on which professors perform vivisection are innocent and threaten no one. Dog vivisection for demonstration purposes benefits no one. It has the potential to stigmatize entire universities.

In sum, the plight of dogs who are raised to be used for vivisection for demonstration purposes is akin to that of veal calves only— given dogs’ trust in and emotional closeness to us— worse. As we survey our moral landscapes, short of ending dog vivisection for demonstration purposes, we can find only one way for professors to reduce in a meaningful way the moral repugnance we feel at what they are doing: Eat the dogs.